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Abstract
In this paper, we contrast direct and representative democracy. In a direct democ-
racy, individuals have the opportunity to vote over the alternatives in every choice
problem the population faces. In a representative democracy, the population commits
to a candidate ex ante who will then make choices on its behalf. While direct democracy
is normatively appealing, representative democracy is the far more common institution
because of its practical advantages. The key question, then, is whether representative
democracy succeeds in implementing the choices that the group would make under
direct democracy. We nd that, in general, it does not. We model a population as
a distribution of voters with strict preferences over a nite set of alternatives and a
candidate as a strict ordering of those alternatives that serves as a binding, contingent
plan of action. We focus on the case where the direct democracy choices of the popu-
lation are consistent with a strict ordering of the alternatives. We show that even in
this case, where the normative recommendation of direct democracy is clearest, repre-
sentative democracy may not elect the candidate with this ordering. Keywords: direct
Mailing Address: 1945 N. High St, Arps Hall 427, Columbus, OH 43210; Email: co¤man.201@osu.edu;
Telephone: 614-247-8718.
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democracy, representative democracy, majoritarianism, social choice, JEL Codes: D71,
D72
1 Introduction
Direct democracy is a fundamental principle of collective decision-making. When a choice
problem arrives, individuals should have the opportunity to express preferences over the
alternatives. A good decision-making rule then aggregates these preferences into a choice
that reects the will of the group. While many aspects of social decision-making have been
debated, this individual right to direct participation has remained a normative ideal from
both a theoretical and popular standpoint.
Yet, despite its normative appeal, direct democracy is relatively rare in practice. Just
over half of the states in the United States allow for recalls and/or popular referendums and
no forms of direct democracy exist at the federal level (NCSL.org). Direct democracy plays a
similarly minor role in the governments of countries around the world, with the well-studied
exception of Switzerland (Frey 1994). Most institutions instead take the form of represen-
tative democracies, under which elected o¢ cials make decisions on behalf of the electorate.
From a practical perspective, representative democracies have an edge over direct democra-
cies as they dramatically reduce transaction costs and shift the burden of decision-making
to a small group of well-informed leaders. The question, then, is whether representative
democracy, with its practical advantages, can successfully implement the choices that would
be reached under the more normatively attractive direct democracy.1
This paper tackles this question from a theoretical perspective. We take a majoritarian
approach to modeling both direct and representative democracy. In addition to being a
widely-implemented and well-accepted political principle, majoritarianism has been shown to
be a collective decision-making rule that works well over a large class of domains (Dasgupta
and Maskin 2008). To analyze outcomes under direct democracy, we simply look at the
tournament over alternatives induced by majority rule. We focus on populations where
majority preferences over alternatives produce a ranking of alternatives, with each alternative
1There is a rich existing literature on representative democracy, though in general this literature has
focused more on voting power and proportional representation. See, for example, Tullock (1967), Chamberlin
and Courant (1983), Monroe (1995), Felsenthal and Machover (1998), and Potthof and Brams (1998).
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majority-preferred to all others below it in the ranking.2 In these cases, the normative
recommendation for representative democracy is most clear: we expect that the candidate
whose preferences best match this ordering of alternatives should be elected.
In our model of representative democracy, members of the population vote over candidates
rather than alternatives. To simplify our setting, we dene a candidate as an ordinal ranking
of alternatives: a binding, contingent plan of action for future choice problems. We assume
that when a choice problem of alternatives arrives, the social decision is made according
to the ordering of the elected candidate.3 The key modeling assumption is how individuals
vote over candidates. We use the Kemeny distance to map preferences over alternatives into
preferences over candidates. That is, when faced with a pairwise choice between candidates,
we assume that an individual votes for the candidate with whom she is most likely to agree
about the choice from a randomly selected pair of alternatives. Once we know individuals
preferences over candidates, we can compare these candidates pairwise. In a comparison
of two candidates, the winning candidate is the candidate who earns a majority of the
populations votes: the candidate with whom the majority of the population is closer to
according to the Kemeny distance. This type of political action generates a tournament
over the candidates. We use the uncovered set to identify the winning candidates given an
arbitrary tournament structure. The uncovered set is an appealing solution concept, as it is
Condorcet consistent and contains only Pareto undominated orderings. The uncovered set
also contains many other popular tournament solution concepts, which allows us to generalize
our results to a variety of other settings.
We nd that for problems with a small number of alternatives, representative democracy
does succeed in electing candidates that implement the choices made under direct democ-
racy. But, for general problems, we derive a negative result. We show that even for the
2This is the case where the tournament over alternatives is not only complete and asymmetric, but also
transitive.
3In the language of Edward Burke, this is a delegate model of representative democracy, rather than
a trustee model, as the elected o¢ cial is committed to enacting the platform selected by the voters. See
Maskin and Tirole (2004) or Fox and Shotts (2013) for discussions of the delegate versus trustee debate.
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most well-behaved populations, where majority preferences over the alternatives are con-
sistent with a strict ordering, representative democracy may not elect the candidate with
this ordering. That is, when given a chance to commit ex ante to a binding plan of action,
the population may select a plan which contradicts the majority preferences on some choice
problems. Following our results section, we discuss related works that highlight the more
general di¢ culty in identifying forms of representative democracy that are consistent with
direct democracy.
2 Notation and Model
We rst lay out notation and then discuss our model.
2.1 Notation
We will adopt much of the notation of Baldiga and Green (2013). We use a nite space
of alternatives, X = fa1; a2; ::::; ang. A preference, denoted , is a strict ordering of
the alternatives, where  corresponds to a permutation of the integers f1; :::; ng; given the
preference  = (a(1)a(2):::a(n)); ai is preferred to aj if and only if  1(i) <  1(j). The
set of all n! preferences over X is . It will be useful to write e to represent the natural
ordering of the alternatives, e = (a1a2:::an) 2 .
A population, , is a distribution over : Let  be the set of all distributions over :
We model a candidate as a strict ordering of the alternatives in X, which serves as a
binding, contingent plan of action. We will write candidate  to denote the candidate with
ordering . In all analysis below, we consider all candidates to be available; that is, the set
of candidates is equal to :
We model these majoritarian systems using tournaments. A tournament is a complete,
asymmetric binary relation. Our analysis considers two types of tournaments: tournaments
on the alternative space and tournaments on the candidate space. We use  (X) to denote a
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tournament on the space of alternatives; we reserve the traditional T to refer to a tour-
nament on the space of candidates, T (): In both cases, a tournament depends upon
the preferences of the population; therefore, we write   or T  to denote the tournaments
generated by a population :
2.2 Models of Direct and Representative Democracy
Under direct democracy, members of the population vote over alternatives. We use the
majority tournament to model these decisions. In this tournament, the relationship be-
tween any pair of alternatives is determined by majority rule: ai aj if
P
2
((jai  aj)) >P
2
((jaj  ai)).4 We write ai aj if ai beats aj in the tournament  (X). In the pop-
ulations we consider below, majority rule over alternatives will be consistent with a strict
ordering. We study this case because of the clear normative recommendation available.
When the majority rule tournament over alternatives produces a strict ordering, then in
order for representative democracy to be consistent with direct democracy, it must also
produce this ordering. In other cases, when majority preferences over alternatives are not
consistent with a strict ordering, there is no clear expectation for how representative democ-
racy should behave. Therefore, we choose only to dene and test for consistency in the case
when majority preferences over alternatives do not cycle.5
Building a model of representative democracy requires a theory of how individuals choose
to vote over candidates. We use the Kemeny distance (also known as the bubble sort distance
and the Kendall distance) to dene individualspreferences over candidates. The Kemeny
distance between  and 0, which we will denote f(; 0), is the number of pairs of alterna-
tives the two orderings rank di¤erently (Kemeny 1959 and Kemeny Snell 1962); we assume
that voters prefer candidates who are closer (in terms of Kemeny distance) to their own
4We restrict attention to populations with no ties in the majority relation, guaranteeing a complete and
asymmetric tournament. This is similar to assuming an odd number of voters in the more common discrete
population framework.
5This is consistent with the approach of La¤ond and Laine (2000), who also focus on the case where
majority preferences over alternatives produce an ordering.
5
ordering of alternatives. Formally, given two candidates  and 0, a voter with preference 00
will prefer  if and only if f(00; ) < f(00; 0). This is equivalent to assuming that a voter
prefers candidate  to candidate 0 if she is more likely to agree with candidate  about the
ranking of a randomly-drawn pair of alternatives (Baldiga and Green (2013) formalize this
interpretation). Of course, there are other ways of mapping preferences over alternatives
into preferences over candidates, and our results will be sensitive to this particular choice.
However, in order for our negative result to be as strong and surprising as possible, we want
to create as much parallelism as we can between the direct and representative democracy
models. Using the Kemeny distance to dene preferences over candidates creates an appeal-
ing symmetry between the direct and representative democracy models. The preferences
over candidates dened by f(; 0) depend only on each voters pairwise preferences over
alternatives, just as the preferences over alternatives dened by majority rule do. Previ-
ous work in this area has also used the Kemeny distance to determine voterspreferences
over orderings. For instance, in their investigation of the strategy-proofness of social welfare
functions, Bossert and Storcken (1992) assume, as we do, that individualspreferences over
orderings are determined by relative proximity under the Kemeny distance. In Figure 1, we
provide an illustration of the Kemeny distances between the six strict orderings in  for the
n = 3 case.
Figure 1: We use a hexagon to demonstrate the space of orderings for the n = 3 case,
with each vertex representing an ordering. Above, we illustrate the Kemeny distances from
e = a1a2a3 to each of the other orderings in the space.
Voterspreferences over candidates generate a tournament on ; which we denote T .
Consider two strict orderings, 0 and . Dene a subset of preferences, 1, such that for
all 00 2 1, we have f(00; 0) < f(00; ), and dene a subset of preferences, 2, such that
6
for all 00 2 2, we have f(00; ) < f(00; 0). Then, we will say that 0 defeats ;that is
0T ; if (1) > (2). In the event that (1) = (2), we can use a random tie-breaking
rule such as a coin ip to determine the T  relationship between  and 0: Note that in the
space of distributions over strict orderings, this is a non-generic event. Furthermore, none
of the results presented below depend upon this assumption. This simply assures that all
tournaments are complete and asymmetric.6
2.3 Tournament Solutions
We consider only the simplest direct democracy tournaments, restricting our attention to
those tournaments generated by populations in which majority rule over alternatives is con-
sistent with a strict ordering. In these cases, there is a clear winner of the tournament: the
alternative which defeats all others in the tournament relation, the Condorcet winner. Fur-
thermore, because there are no cycles, we can describe the tournament by a strict ordering
where each alternative is majority-preferred to all those below it.
However, for general tournaments, including the tournaments over strict orderings we
study below, identifying the winners is non-trivial as the tournament relation may cycle.
Therefore, we need a tournament solution that will determine the best elements given an
arbitrary tournament structure. We use the uncovered set as our tournament solution (see
Gilles (1959), Fishburn (1977), and Miller (1980) for early work on this topic). We follow the
6This denition means we employ relative majority rule. We could alternatively dene our tournaments
in terms of absolute majority rule. Under this assumption, we would have 0T only if a majority of voters
are strictly closer to 0 than . For absolute majority rule, if neither candidate is closer to more than half
of the population, the two candidates would tie in the tournament relation.
In our framework, voters will often be indi¤erent between candidates. Each voter has a set of indi¤erence
curves: a voter most prefers the candidate with his own ordering, then he equally prefers all candidates with
whom he disagrees about the choice from one pair of alternatives, and next he equally prefers all candidates
with whom he disagrees about the choice from two pairs of candidates, etc.
Given the large amount of indi¤erence in our population, choosing to use absolute majority rule would
result in a large number of ties in our tournaments over orderings. These ties would disregard the information
we have on the voters who are not indi¤erent. For instance, in a tie between candidate  and 0, we may
have that 30% of the voters are indi¤erent between candidate  and candidate 0, 49% of the voters prefer 
to 0, and only 21% of voters prefer 0 to . Despite the large disparity in the number of voters that strictly
prefer  to 0 as opposed to 0 to , these two orderings would tie in the tournament relation. By using
relative majority rule, we use this information on strict preference, even in the cases where large subsets of
voters are indi¤erent between the two candidates.
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denition given by Laslier (1997), applied to our tournaments over strict orderings. First,
dene the covering relation of T . For a given T , we say i covers j if and only if:
(a) iTj; and
(b) for all k 2 ; jTk ) iTk
The uncovered set of T is the set of maximal elements of the covering relation: i 2
UC(T ) if and only if there does not exist j 2  such that j covers i:
As Miller (1980) describes, the uncovered set has a number of appealing properties. The
uncovered set is always a non-empty subset of the top cycle. And, unlike the top cycle, it
contains only Pareto undominated orderings.7 It is Condorcet consistent: if a Condorcet
winner exists, it will be the sole member of the uncovered set. The uncovered set also
characterizes the outcomes under a variety of familiar voting rules. Miller (1980) and Shepsle
and Weingast (1984) have shown that a number of voting procedures under both sincere and
sophisticated voting implement elements of the uncovered set. These results motivate our
use of the uncovered set. By working with this tournament solution, we avoid making specic
institutional assumptions. Instead, we identify the likely winners under majoritarian voting
rules more generally, under both sincere and strategic voting. Most importantly, for our
purposes, the uncovered set contains many other familiar tournament solution concepts.
Thus, the negative result we prove in this framework extends to a wide variety of other
reasonable approaches.
With this solution concept in place, we are ready to dene consistency between direct
and representative democracy in our setting.
Denition 1 If majority preferences over alternatives are consistent with a strict ordering,
, and  2 UC(T ), we will say that order consistency holds. If, in addition, UC(T ) is
a singleton, we will say that strong order consistency holds.
Note that UC(T ) will be a singleton if and only if there is a Condorcet winner of this
7Note that a positive result (consistency between these forms of direct and representative democracy)
could be derived if one chose to use the less selective top cycle as the tournament solution concept. We
discuss this in more detail in Section 3.
8
tournament. Thus, strong order consistency requires that the candidate consistent with
majority preferences is selected as the unique Condorcet winner of the tournament over
candidates. In the analysis that follows, we show that strong order consistency holds for the
case of n = 3 but fails for problems with n > 3. Then, we provide a counterexample that
illustrates order consistency fails for n = 10.
3 Consistency Results for Direct and Representative
Democracy
First, we introduce a useful proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider a population where majority preferences are consistent with e.
Consider a strict ordering . Obtain 0 from  by transposing exactly one pair of adja-
cent alternatives that appear in the natural order in  (that is, transpose a pair of adjacent
alternatives that  ordered in line with majority preference). Then, it must be that T 0
for all such 0. Furthermore, if we take any of these 0 and obtain 00 from 0 by transposing
exactly one pair of adjacent alternatives that appeared in the natural order in both  and 0,
we must have T 00.
Proof: Intuitively, when  and 0 agree on all but a single pair of alternatives, a voter
with the ordering 000 will be closest to whichever of these orderings it agrees with on the
pair in the question. Since  agrees with the majority preference on the pair in question, a
greater share of the population must be closer to , yielding T 0.
We can take this logic one step further to prove the claim for cases where  and 00 agree
on all but two pairs of alternatives. Denote by  the subset of the population that agrees
with  on the rst pair in question (the one transposed to obtain 0). Denote by  the subset
of the population that agrees with  on the second pair in question (the one transposed to
obtain 00). Because  is consistent with the majority preference on both of these pairs, we
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know that () > 1
2
and () > 1
2
. Therefore:
2 (( \ )) + (n) + (n) > 1
We can rearrange this expression to show that:
( \ ) > 1  ((n) + (n) + ( \ ))
The left-hand side of this equation is the fraction of the population that agrees with  on
both of the pairs in question and will be closer to . The right-hand side of this equation
is the fraction of the population that disagrees with  on both of the pairs in question and
will be closer to 00. The rest of the population will be equidistant. Thus, the equation tells
us that a larger fraction of the population will be closer to  than 00, yielding T 00. 
The following corollary is a straightforward implication of Proposition 1 and will prove
useful in the following sections.
Corollary 1 A strict ordering that is consistent with the majority preferences of a population
, call this , must beat all strict orderings that are no more than two transpositions away
from it; that is, we must have T  for all  such that f(; )  2:
3.1 Consistency for n=3
We exploit this knowledge of the structure of tournaments over orderings to prove results for
the n = 3 case for populations with majority preferences consistent with a strict ordering.
Proposition 2 For n = 3; UC(T ) satises strong order consistency.
Proof: We will work through the case where a1 a2, a2 a3, and a1 a3. As Figure 1
clearly demonstrates, we know that a1a3a2, a2a1a3, a2a3a1, and a3a1a2 are each less than or
equal to distance 2 from a1a2a3. Therefore, by Proposition 1, we know a1a2a3T  for each
 2 fa1a3a2; a2a1a3; a2a3a1; a3a1a2g. Therefore, we just need to show that a1a2a3T a3a2a1
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in order to prove that a1a2a3 is the Condorcet winner of the tournament, and hence the only
member of the uncovered set. We can use the fact that a1 a3:
X
i2
((i)ja1 i a3) >
X
i2
((i)ja3 i a1)
(a1a2a3) + (a1a3a2) + (a2a1a3) > (a2a3a1) + (a3a1a2) + (a3a2a1)
This inequality states that the fraction of the population with orderings closer to a1a2a3
than a3a2a1 (the left-hand side) is greater than the fraction of the population with orderings
closer to a3a2a1 than a1a2a3: Thus, a1a2a3T a3a2a1, and UC(T ) = fa1a2a3g. 
3.2 Inconsistency for General Problems
First, we present an example that shows that for n = 4, strong order consistency fails.
Consider the following population:
 ()
a1a2a3a4 .399
a2a4a1a3 .2
a1a4a3a2 .2
a3a4a1a2 .201
The majority preferences of this population are consistent with e = a1a2a3a4. But,
there is no Condorcet winner of the tournament over candidates. Consider ^ = a4a1a3a2.
We have f(^; a1a4a3a2) < f(e; a1a4a3a2) and f(^; a3a4a1a2) < f(e; a3a4a1a2), and we have
f(^; a2a4a1a3) = f(e; a2a4a1a3). So,
X
2
[()jf(^; ) < f(e; )] >
X
2
[()jf(e; ) < f(^; )]
As a result, ^T e. And, in fact, we can show that ^ 2 UC(T ), with UC(T ) =
fe; a1a2a4a3; a1a4a2a3; ^g. We can extend this n = 4 example to a problem with an arbitrary
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number of alternatives by preserving the structure above for the rst four alternatives and
simply appending additional alternatives in their natural order to the right end of each of
the four orderings above. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For n > 3; UC(T ) fails strong order consistency.
This is the strongest result that we can achieve for n = 4. In the Appendix, we prove
that order consistency must hold for n = 4 populations. For n  10, we are able to prove
a stronger result. We identify populations in which the strict ordering consistent with the
majority preferences is covered.
Theorem 1 For n  10; UC(T ) fails order consistency:
Proof: We prove this through a general counterexample. First, we construct the popula-
tion. The majority preferences of our population  will be consistent with e on all possible
pairs drawn from among the n alternatives. Select a set of j pairs of alternatives, where
5  j  n
2
. Each pair should consist of two adjacent elements in the natural ordering, and
all pairs in the set should be disjoint. For example, it would be permissible to select fa1; a2g
and fa3; a4g as two of the pairs, but one could not select fa1; a2g and fa2; a3g, or fa1; a3g and
fa4; a6g. It will be helpful to have notation for the j pairs; let them be denoted p1; p2; :::; pj.
Note that since the pairs consist of adjacent and disjoint alternatives, it is always possible
to nd a strict ordering  that agrees with the majority preference on any particular subset
of the pairs fp1; p2; :::; pjg exactly.
We will associate with each of the j pairs a particular strict ordering, pi , where pi
agrees with the majority preference on pair pi, disagrees with the majority preferences on
the other j  1 pairs in the set fp1; p2; :::; pjg, and agrees with the majority preference on all
other pairs of alternatives.
Allocate the population as follows. Let (e) = 1
2
  ", where " < 1
2j
. Divide the rest of
the population evenly among the strict orderings fp1 ; p2 ; :::; pjg, creating j equal masses
of size
1
2
+"
j
:
12
It is straightforward to check that this population produces majority rule over alternatives
that agrees with e. For each pair not included in fp1; p2; :::; pjg, the population unanimously
prefers ai to ai+k, where i; k 2 f1; ::; n  1g. For each of the pairs in fp1; p2; :::; pjg, we have
that (1
2
  ") + ( 12+"
j
) > 1
2
agrees with e.
Now we will show that for this population e =2 UC(T ). We do so by identifying a
strict ordering that covers e: Consider the strict ordering that disagrees with the majority
preferences on all of the pairs fp1; p2; :::; pjg and agrees with the majority preference on
all other pairs. Denote this ordering ^. Since we are working with f(; 0), the distance
between any two orderings is, up to a scale factor, the number of pairs over which the two
orderings disagree. For simplicity, we will scale our distances below to the number of pairwise
disagreements.
First we will show that ^T e. We have f(pi ; ^) = 1 and f(pi ; e) = j   1 8i 2 f1; :::; jg.
Therefore, we have 1
2
+ " of the population that is closer to ^ than e; so ^T e:
In order to prove that ^ covers e, we must show that there cannot exist a 0 such that
eT0 but 0T ^. Suppose there did exist such a 0.
We have that eT0. This implies that we have f(e; pi)  f(0; pi) for at least some
i 2 f1; :::; jg. Because we know f(e; pi) = j   1, this implies that f(0; pi)  j   1 for at
least some i 2 f1; :::; jg:
We also know that 0T ^. Then we must have that f(0; pk)  f(^; pk) for at least
some k 2 f1; :::; jg. We know that f(^; pk) = 1 for all k 2 f1; :::; jg; which implies that
f(0; pk)  1 for at least some k 2 f1; :::; jg:
Finally, we know that f(pi ; pk)  2 for any i; k 2 f1; :::; jg:
This creates the following violation of the triangle inequality: f(0; pk)  1, f(pi ; pk) 
2, and f(0; pi)  j   1, where j  5: This is a contradiction.
Therefore, there can exist no 0 such that eT0 but 0T ^. As a result, we can conclude
that ^ covers e: Thus, e cannot be a member of the uncovered set. 
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This proof describes a method for constructing populations for which direct and rep-
resentative democracy yield di¤erent choices. These populations have a rather intuitive
interpretation. Let us think about a population constructed by the method above for the
case of n = 10. First, we note the distinction between the ve contestedissues (fa1; a2g;
fa3; a4g; fa5; a6g; fa7; a8g; fa9; a10g) and the other 40 pairwise choices that are decided unan-
imously. The largest mass of voters, just under half of them, have the preference e. Let us
call these our mainstream voters. The remaining voters are divided evenly among ve
smaller minority preferences. Each minority agrees with the mainstream preference on just
one of the contested issues; on the other hand, each minority group agrees with every other
minority group on three of the ve contested issues. In this way, the minority preferences
are all more similar to one another than to the mainstream voters.
When voting directly over the alternatives, the population implements choices consistent
with e. Most of the choices are unanimous; and, for the ve contested pairs, the mainstream
voters and one of the minority groups form a majority. Though the minority groups have
similar preferences, when voting issue-by-issue, they never vote all together on a contested
issue. As a result, the mainstream voters are able to implement their preferred choices.
We can contrast this with the dynamic under representative democracy. In this setting,
candidate e cannot be elected. Though e attracts the mainstream voters, there exist candi-
dates that all ve minority groups prefer to e. Consider candidate ^, who agrees with the
unanimous choices of the population but disagrees with the majority preference on the ve
contested pairs. All ve minority grouips prefer ^ to e; together, they consist of a major-
ity of the population and can succeed in electing this compromise candidate. The choices
of the selected candidates in representative democracy are more closely aligned with the
minority preferences than the choices under direct democracy. The ability of the minority
groups to compromise under representative democracy produces choices that are di¤erent
than those implemented under direct democracy but that are preferred by more than half
the population.
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Table 1: Summary of Consistency Results
Strong Order Consistency Order Consistency
n = 3 + +
n = 4   +
5  n  9   ?
n > 10    
+ indicates a positive result for given n and property; - indicates a negative result
We summarize our results in Table 1, with + indicating a positive result and   indicating
a negative result. Order consistency results for 5  n  9 remain an open question. Our
strategy here focuses on generating populations by manipulating preferences over disjoint,
adjacent pairs. This approach has been fruitful in constructing populations for which order
consistency fails, though it may require more alternatives than might be necessary with other
approaches.
4 Related Work and Discussion
Our result is closely related to the work of La¤ond and Lainé (2000). La¤ond and Lainé
(2000) dene a tournament consistency axiom that is very similar to our strong order con-
sistency property. Their tournament consistency requires that if majority preferences over
alternatives are consistent with an ordering, then the candidate with that ordering must
be the Condorcet winner of the tournament over candidates. They characterize the set of
preference extension rules (mappings from preferences over alternatives into preferences over
candidates) that satisfy tournament consistency. There are technical di¤erences between the
two environments, including the impotant distinction that La¤ond and Lainé (2000) require
this type of tournament consistency over any subset of alternatives; that is, if majority prefer-
ences over some subset of alternatives are consistent with an ordering, the candidate (dened
as an ordering over that subset) whose ordering is consistent with those preferences must be
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the Condorcet winner of the tournament of orderings restricted to that subset.8 But, the
more important conceptual di¤erence is that we prove that for one particular and intuitive
way of dening preferences over candidates from preferences over alternatives, something
even weaker than strong order consistency (or tournament consistency) fails. Not only is the
candidate whose ordering is consistent with majority preferences not the Condorcet winner
of the tournament (what we call a failure of strong order consistency), that candidate may
not even be a member of the uncovered set of the tournament (a failure of order consistency).
Also related is the work of Lainé, Ozkes, and Sanver (working paper). In their frame-
work, preferences over alternatives are mapped into preferences over candidates (or hyper-
preferences) by a betweenness criterion: an individual with preference over alternatives 
prefers candidate 0 to candidate 00 if the set of pairs that  and 00 agree on is a subset
of the set of pairs  and 0 agree on. As they describe, the preference extension dened by
the Kemeny distance is a member of this family. They then dene Kemeny-stability, a type
of consistency property for a social welfare function. They describe a social welfare function
as Kemeny-stable if a linear extension of the weak order selected by the social welfare func-
tion when applied to the population of preferences over alternatives is also selected by the
social welfare function when applied to the population of preferences over candidates (where
preferences over candidates are determined by the Kemeny distance). They show that many
popular social welfare functions are not Kemeny stable, including unanimous scoring rules,
the Copeland solution, the Slater solution, and the Kemeny rule. Their Kemeny-stability
consistency property is very close to our notion of order consistency. In relation to their
results, our paper could be interpreted as showing that the uncovered set fails a property
similar to Kemeny-stability.
While our model is quite di¤erent, our results echo the ndings of Besley and Coate
8The other technical di¤erence is that La¤ond and Laine (2000) restrict the set of preference extension
rules (mappings from preferences over alternatives into preferences over candidates) they consider to those
rules that produce complete linear orders over candidates, explicitly disallowing indi¤erence. We map pref-
erences over alternatives into preferences over candidates using the Kemeny distance, and we allow voters
to be indi¤erent over candidates whose orderings are equidistant from their own. In this way, the particular
mapping we study is not in their permissible class of preference extension rules.
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(2008), who study the question of whether citizens initiatives that allow citizens to cast
votes directly over issues improve upon the outcomes reached under electoral competition
among representatives. Their model consists of a two party political system, where the
population makes decisions in a two-dimensional policy space. Using this framework, they
show that the elected candidates may implement policies that are at odds with the majority
preferences of the population. They attribute these errors to the bundling of issues that is
inherent in the election of a representative. As in our model, when issues are decided upon
concurrently, via the choice of a representative, decisions may diverge from those made when
citizens are able to vote directly over issues, one at a time. Ahn and Oliveros (2012) prove a
similar result in the case where individualspreferences over issues are not separable. They
work in a game-theoretic, cardinal environment, in which voterspreferences over bundles
of issues are determined by expected utility-maximization. They show that when voters
preferences over the issues are not separable, then the voting strategies that result in the
election of the Condorcet winning bundle may not be an equilibrium of the model. Our
paper shows that, in a much simpler, ordinal environment, even in the case where there
are no complementarities or substitutabilities across issues, the bundling of choices may be
distortionary.
We have chosen to use the uncovered set as the solution concept for our tournaments.
How heavily does our result depend on this choice? One of the most attractive features of
the uncovered set is that many other popular tournament solution concepts are subsets of
the uncovered set (Laslier 1997). Therefore, it is possible to extend our negative result to
many other solution concepts. This includes the basic renements of the uncovered set, the
iterated uncovered set and the minimal covering set. It also includes the Banks solution and
the Bipartisan set (Banks 1985, La¤ond, Laslier, and Le Breton 1993) . Another well-studied
method for identifying tournament winners is ranking the members of the tournament based
upon their victories and losses within the tournament. The most popular of these ranking
methods include the Copeland solution, the Markov solution, and the Slater solution, each
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of which is also a renement of the uncovered set (see, Copeland 1951, Daniels 1959, and
Slater 1961). In addition, Brandt, Geist, and Harrenstein (working paper) have shown that
any Pareto optimal method for selecting winners of the majoritarian tournament must be
a renement of the uncovered set; thus, our negative result extends to every rule in that
family of tournament solutions as well. Thus, the comparably large size of the uncovered
set is quite an attractive property for our purposes. Furthermore, the uncovered set has the
appealing property that many models of strategic voting, not just sincere voting, lead to
selection of members of the uncovered set; for instance, Miller (1980) develops a model of
two-party electoral competition with strategic voting that leads to election of a member of
the uncovered set, and Shepsle and Weingast (1984) show that the amendment procedure
under strategic voting also elects a member of the uncovered set. Therefore, our negative
result would also extend to these specic models of sophisticated voting.
However, if we expanded our solution concept to the top cycle (Schwartz 1972), which
contains the uncovered set, we could prove a positive result.9
Proposition 4 For any population with majority preferences consistent with an ordering,
,  is a member of the top cycle of the tournament over orderings.
We can prove this using Proposition 1. Start with . By performing one transposition
at a time, each time transposing a pair of alternatives that were ordered according to the
majority preference, we can construct a chain, T iT jT :::T , from  to any other
ordering . Thus, we must have  2 TC(T ). 
But for populations like the one in our counterexample, the top cycle is large; it will
contain many other orderings, including our ^. Thus, while order consistency would hold,
strong order consistency would fail: a candidate whose preferences are misaligned with the
majority preferences over at least some issues would be electable. The results of La¤ond
9Lainé, Ozkes, and Sanver (Working paper) prove a stronger version of this proposition, showing that the
top cycle not only fails Kemeny-stability (similar in spirit to what we show here), but also fails their more
general hyper-stability property. See Theorem 6 in their paper.
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and Lainé (2000) and Lainé , Ozkes, and Sanver (working paper) also highlight the more
general di¢ culty of identifying forms of representative democracy that respect majority
preferences over alternatives. La¤ond and Lainé (2000) show that only lexicographic pref-
erence extension rules (preference extension rules for mapping preferences over alternatives
into preferences), result in consistency between direct and representative democracy in their
environment; Lainé , Ozkes, and Sanver (working paper) show that when preferences over
candidates are dened by the Kemeny distance, many other familiar social welfare functions,
including unanimous scoring rules, result in inconsistencies between choices under direct and
representative democracies.
Our models operate on populations of strict preferences, however, the negative result
that we have identied can be derived in a more basic setting as well. Consider a population
of individuals who each had a yes/no preference on ve di¤erent spending projects. We can
apply our same rule for mapping individualspreferences over alternatives into preferences
over candidates. When deciding between two candidates, we assume that an individual votes
for the candidate with whom she agrees on the greatest number of issues. In a population
similar to that described in the proof of Theorem 1, the majority preference would be to
vote yes on each of these ve issues separately, but under representative democracy, the
population would never elect the candidate who would vote yes on all ve issues.
This example shows that our result does not depend on our assumption that voters
preferences take the form of orderings. What is important for our result is the existence
of multiple issues. Under a direct democracy, voters express preferences over issues one
at a time. Therefore, voters who may be very similar with respect to their decisions over
the entire set of issues - they would agree most of the time - can end up voting di¤erently
on any one particular issue. But in a representative democracy, voters are able to express
preferences over the entire set of issues by voting for a candidate. In this way, representative
democracy can serve to unite and empower groups of voters with similar, but not identical
preferences.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof for n=4
In this section, we prove Proposition 3 stated in Section 3.2. For n = 4, UC(T ) satises
order consistency.
Proof: Assume majority preferences are consistent with e. We show that there is no
ordering that can cover e. The key step is to recognize that we can apply Proposition 1
to rule out any ordering fewer than 5 transpositions from e: eT  for any  within two
transpositions, so they cannot cover e, and for those three or four transpositions away, even
if they beat e, they will be defeated by at least one ordering one or two transpositions
from e (which e beats). So, the only orderings that could potentially cover e are ve or six
transpositions away from e: fa4a3a1a2; a4a2a3a1; a3a4a2a1; a4a3a2a1g. We rule these out one
at a time:
We cannot have a4a3a1a2 covers e, since eT a2a3a1a4T a4a3a1a2 for any population
with majority preferences consistent with e: Proposition 1 proves eT a2a3a1a4. We cannot
have a4a3a1a2T a2a3a1a4 since all of the orderings closer or equidistant to a4a3a1a2 than
a2a3a1a4 have a4 precedes a2. Thus, if more than half the population were closer to or
equidistant to a4a3a1a2, we would not have a2  a4 in the majority preference.
We cannot have a4a2a3a1 covers e, since we must have eT a4a2a3a1. All of the orderings
closer or equidistant to a4a3a1a2 than e have a4 precedes a1. Thus, if more than half the
population were closer to or equidistant to a4a2a3a1 than to e, we would not have a1  a4
in the majority preference.
We cannot have a3a4a2a1 covers e, since eT a1a4a2a3T  a3a4a2a1 for any population
with majority preferences consistent with e:Proposition 1 proves eT a1a4a2a3. We cannot
have a3a4a2a1T a1a4a2a3 since all of the orderings closer or equidistant to a1a4a2a3 than
a3a4a2a1 have a3 precedes a1. Thus, if more than half the population were closer to or
equidistant to a3a4a2a1, we would not have a1  a3 in the majority preference.
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We cannot have a4a3a2a1 covers e, since eT a1a3a2a4T a4a3a2a1 for any population
with majority preferences consistent with e: Proposition 1 proves eT a1a3a2a4. We cannot
have a4a3a2a1T a1a3a2a4 since all of the orderings closer or equidistant to a4a3a2a1 than
a1a3a2a4 have a4 precedes a1. Thus, if more than half the population were closer to or
equidistant to a4a3a2a1, we would not have a1  a4 in the majority preference. 
5.2 Population Restrictions
A natural question to ask in this context is whether we can impose restrictions on the
distribution of preferences that would guarantee order consistency. This domain restriction
approach has been adopted by many social choice theorists in attempts to rule out other
paradoxical outcomes; perhaps most classic is the single-peakedness restriction pioneered
independently by Black (1948) and Arrow (1951) and generalized by Sen and Pattanaik
(1969). Their goal was to describe a class of populations for which majority rule over
alternatives would not cycle. The domain restriction they proposed requires populations
to be unimodal in the sense that all members of the population, for any particular triple of
alternatives, must be able to agree on an alternative that is not worst. Assuming the number
of voters is odd, this condition is su¢ cient for transitive majority rule.
Clearly, this restriction will not be enough to assure order consistency, as the class of
populations we consider in our counterexample above are indeed single-peaked in terms of
preferences over alternatives. However, we can use a similar idea, that of restricting the
number of modes in the distribution, in order to derive a su¢ cient condition for order con-
sistency in our framework. The class of populations with transitive majority rule consistent
with the ordering e can be thought of as having a peak or cluster of weight around e.
Our su¢ ciency condition says that as we move away from e, we must not encounter another
cluster of orderings similar to one another. In order to state this condition more formally,
it will be useful to introduce some new terminology. When referring to a population with
transitive majority rule consistent with e, we will call any pairwise disagreement with e an
21
error. For example, we will say that an ordering  that is m transpositions from e contains
m errors. We can state our su¢ ciency condition in terms of these errors.
Proposition 5 Consider the class of populations with transitive majority rule consistent
with e. Then, order consistency holds if for any set of m errors, m = 5, we have
X
(j contains at least 1
2
of these m errors) <
1
2
Proof. Suppose e =2UC(T ). We will show there must exist a set of m errors, m = 5, such
that
X
(j contains at least 1
2
of these m errors) > 1
2
. Since e =2UC(T ), we know there
exists ^ such that ^ covers e. Let ^ contain m errors; we know m = 5 in order for ^ to cover
e. Since ^ and e agree on all pairwise choices outside of the m errors, we know that f(; ^)
and f(; e) are determined only by how many of the m errors  contains. Those  that have
less than 1
2
of the m errors have f(; e) < f(; ^). So, suppose the set of orderings that had
at least 1
2
of these m errors in common with ^ had mass less than 1
2
. Then, we would haveX
(jf(; e) < f(; ^) > 1
2
. This would imply eT ^, contradicting ^ covers e.
This su¢ ciency condition has a straightforward intuition. If we encounter a population
that contains a mass of orderings that are both (a) relatively distant from e, and (b) relatively
close to one another, then we may have the type of counterexample presented above. This
type of cluster of similar orderings far from e may be able to agree upon a compromise
candidate which covers e, but only if together they constitute a majority. The condition
rules out this possibility by assuring that no such cluster of mass greater than 1
2
exists.
This is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for order consistency. A gray area exists
between the class of populations described in our counterexample above and the class of
populations described by this su¢ ciency condition. For some populations that fail the con-
dition above, the distribution of mass on orderings far from e may be too dispersed to agree
upon an ordering like ^ which could beat everything that e beats. One might ask whether
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we could improve the su¢ ciency condition by restricting this set of distant orderings to fall
within a certain radius of one another. Below, we provide an example that illustrates why
this strategy fails.
Example 1 Why Tightening the Su¢ ciency Condition by Restricting the Radius of the Out-
lier Orderings Does Not Work
Consider the following population, a slight variant from the example presented in Section
3:
 ()
e 1
2
  2"
a1a2a4a3a6a5a8a7a10a9
1
5
(1
2
  ")
a2a1a3a4a6a5a8a7a10a9
1
5
(1
2
  ")
a2a1a4a3a5a6a8a7a10a9
1
5
(1
2
  ")
a2a1a4a3a6a5a7a8a10a9
1
5
(1
2
  ")
a2a1a4a3a6a5a8a7a9a10
1
5
(1
2
  ")
a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1 3"
Using the strategy from the proof above, we can show that ^ = a2a1a4a3a6a5a8a7a10a9
covers e, the ordering consistent with majority preferences. We need to show that (a)
^T e and (b) for all 0 2 ; eT 0 ) ^T 0. First we will show that ^T e. For the ve
orderings in population with weight 1
5
(1
2
  "); we have f(; ^) = 1 and f(; e) = 4. And,
we know a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1 is closer to ^ than e, since it is maximally distant from
e. Thus, 1
2
+ 2" of the population is closer to ^ than e, so ^T e: Now we need to show
there cannot exist 0 such that eT 0 but 0T ^: Suppose there did exist such a 0. Then,
eT 0 implies that for at least one of the orderings  in population other than e, f(e; ) 
f(0; ). We know there cannot exist a 0, 0 6= e, such that f(e; a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1) 
f(0; a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1). So, it must be that this is true for one of the remaining ve
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orderings. Since for any of these orderings f(e; ) = 4, we must have f(0; )  4 for at
least one of those ve orderings . And, the fact that 0T ^ implies that we have at least
one of the following two cases:
1. For at least one of the orderings with weight 1
5
(1
2
  "), we have f(0; )  f(^; ).
2. For both e and a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1, we have f(0; ) < f(^; ).
For case 1, we know f(^; ) = 1, so this would imply, f(0; )  1 for one of the orderings
with weight 1
5
(1
2
  "). This leads to the same violation of the triangle inequality that we
reached above, since for any two orderings with weight 1
5
(1
2
  "), we have f(i; j)  2.
For case 2, f(0; e) < f(^; e) implies f(0; e) < 5: And, f(0; a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1) <
f(^; a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1) implies f(0; a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1) < 40. But, f(0; e) < 5 and
f(0; a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1) < 40 cannot both hold, since the rst implies 0 has fewer than
ve errors and the second implies it has more than 5 errors. This leads to a contradiction.
Thus, order consistency fails for this population.
This example illustrates the di¢ culty we encounter if we attempt to tighten the su¢ ciency
condition for ordering consistency by imposing a radius around the orderings with common
errors. Taking the basic counterexample from above, where the minority orderings all lie
relatively close to another, we can move some weight to a10a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2a1 and still arrive
at ^ covers e. Thus, it is not always true that we need the minority orderings to be relatively
close to one another in order to have order consistency fail.
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